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Book Reviews 
The High Medieval Dream Vision: Poetry, Philosophy, and Literary Form by 
Kathryn L. Lynch. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988. Pp. xiv + 263. 
$35.00. 
Kathryn Lynch's intriguing and fascinating study of medieval dream vision 
poetry reinterprets the dream vision genre and Ie-evaluates the five works 
she identifies as central to her discussion-Boethius' De Consolatione Philoso-
phiae, Alain de Lille's De Planetu Naturae, Jean de Meun's Roman de la Rose, 
Dante's Purgatoria, and John Gower's Confessio Amantis. She limits her focus 
to what she calls the "high medieval dream vision poem," a subgenre which 
she identifies as philosophical (a term she prefers over "Boethian"), crystalliz-
ing within the formative period approximately between the years 1100 and 
1300. Her background material has been thoroughly researched, and her the-
sis proceeds logically and forcefully along consistently subtle and finely nu-
anced readings. Drawing upon a wide range of earlier classical and medieval 
visions, theories of dreams, and modern critical commentary, Lynch argues 
persuasively for a "historicization" of the dream vision genre, by which she 
means linking such poems to their specific philosophical and cultural back-
grounds. 
In many ways, Lynch's book is an important event in medieval dream vi-
sion studies. She views "genre" in terms of reception theory, hermeneutics, 
and traditional historical scholarship, and while she does not redefine the 
term, she nevertheless arrives at a new working synthesis; her combined 
diachronic and synchronic approach avoids the essentialist and formalist ex-
tremes of much earlier and current dream vision theory. Her work is decid-
edly "historicist" in the best traditional sense, although she denies that view 
which sees genre as merely reflective or expressive of meaning. Susceptible 
to historical pressures, genre nevertheless participates in meaning production, 
its evolutionary modifications themselves contributing to philosophical ex-
ploration of generic preoccupations. Her analyses of individual works remain 
within the confines of traditional criticism, yet within her generic paradigm 
she adapts her methods to the work in hand with close and sensitive atten-
tion to stylistics as well as the more conventional concerns of allegorical fig-
ure and narrative structure. Finally, her reassessment of medieval literary 
theory, especially her exploration of the role and function of the imagination, 
provides a necessary chapter in the history of medieval dream vision criti-
cism, and represents a substantial insight into both the genre and the litera-
ture of the period. 
As her title suggests, however, Lynch sets for herself a formidable and am-
bitious task. Philosophy, literary theory, criticism, and dream theory, placed 
within the historical perspectives of shifting medieval climates of opinion, 
form the background to interpretation. The result is a complex book richly 
textured with detailed and highly interdisciplinary arguments which defy ac-
curate summary, and my commentary must necessarily be selective. A book 
of such scope, of course, frequently entails risks proportional to the venture, 
and the real accomplishment of this book lies in the relatively few weak-
nesses discernible among its many strengths. 
Lynch argues that within the greater genre of dream vision poetry we can 
distinguish a subgenre-the philosophical vision. Originating with Boethius' 
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Consolation, the philosophical vision has an explicitly discursive function; re-
peating allegorical characters (Nature, Reason, and Genius) and a shared con-
cern with arguments centered on sex, love, the limits of human knowledge, 
and the use and status of poetic fictions define its basic parameters. The in-
forming principle behind this type of vision is the preoccupation with" order" 
(the harmony of the natural and the supernatural) and its intelligibility. 
Because the medieval spirit of synthesis has its location in the thirteenth 
century and prior to it, Lynch modifies her scope to include only the High 
Medieval Dream Vision. The thrust for the harmony of nature and superna-
ture rests in the security of an earlier metaphysics, based on the realist theory 
of abstraction, and when this theory breaks down in the fourteenth century, 
Lynch argues, poets and poetry associated with the dream vision change. 
Poets writing philosophical visions, then, are High as opposed to Late Medie-
val figures, or, like Dante and John Gower, conservatives harkening back to 
an older world view. Lynch justifies her historical limitation of the subgenre 
on the premise that the prenominalist epistemological model based on the 
metaphysical theory of abstraction represents the essential paradigm, and 
much of her book explores this paradigm in itself and in context of the five 
major works and their immediate sources, which she analyzes. 
The limited scope of Lynch's book is both a strength and weakness. It al-
lows her a workable field of inquiry which avoids some of the pitfalls of ear-
lier studies. Scholars have grouped as dream visions works so numerous and 
diverse in character that generalizations about genre become too broad to be 
of much use. Attempts to discover archetypes connecting dream visions with 
actual dreams and visions tend to create essences or universals which deny 
the necessary historical positioning of particular works and reduce distinc-
tions between the medieval period and ours. Lynch seeks to examine the 
philosophical vision as it evolves in medieval time subject to changing histor-
ical (philosophical) pressures, and her manageable focus restricts her perspec-
tive to texts similar in form and aim. Her willingness to include Dante and 
Gower, however, threatens her self-imposed limitations, and begs several 
questions. If Gower, why not Chaucer and Langland? Lynch answers that 
while Langland and Chaucer engage similar problems in their dream visions, 
their fourteenth century ambiguity towards clear possibilities of knowing im-
plies a loss of the harmonizing struggle central to the philosophical vision 
(Langland) or a distorting contamination of philosophical vision by the 
courtly love subgenre with its different intentions (Chaucer). Since Chaucer 
and Langland base large portions of their works on philosophical visions 
Lynch deems central (Langland's Knyde presents the dreamer with 
"ensaumples to knowe,fThorugh ech a creature, Kynde my creatour to 
lovye" [Passus 11, B-Text, 324-25J and Chaucer's "goddesse Nature" is de-
vised "right as Aleyn, in the Pleynt of Kynde" [The Parliament of Fowls, 303, 
316J refer respectively to the theory of abstraction and the Plaint of Nature), 
exclusion of them and other later writers would seem to require a fuller justi-
fication than Lynch provides. Furthermore, Dante's philosophical vision con-
sists of only part of the Purgatorio (cantos 9-27), and although one can agree 
with Lynch that Dante seems in this section of the Commedia preoccupied 
with a philosophical ascent from imagination and image to reason and idea, 
can we legitimately extract relevant passages and present them as "subge-
neric," equivalent to the formal unity the philosophical vision represents? 
,-
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The principle which animates Lynch's discussionf however, is her outline 
of the essentially Aristotelian theory of abstraction and the role imagination 
plays in its medieval adaptation. Medieval literary theory has occasioned 
much recent interest and attention, both in its own right and as part of our 
current fascination with literary theory within the discipline of English 
studies. Lynch contributes to this ongoing debate with her lllustration of in-
terdisciplinary correspondences, for she argues persuasively for a series of 
key connections among the theory of abstraction, medieval faculty psychol-
ogy, liminal experiences, dream lore, ritual and narrative structure, and theo-
ries of literature. According to the theory of abstraction, knowledge begins 
with sense impressions from the natural, phenomenal world; imagination 
creates "images" of particular impressions, stores them, and combines them; 
reason then abstracts from these images "essences," "universals" or "ideas," 
the intellectual foundation of knowledge in realist or moderately realist phi-
losophy; memory stores the conclusions of reason and perhaps images of 
sense impression, establishing the possibility of experience. The three facul-
ties-imagination, reason, and memory-allow the process of knowledge to 
take place, and are capable, then, of actualizing a harmony between the nat-
ural world of appearances and the intelligible world of ideas, which corre-
spond to the ideas in the mind of God responsible for the creation of the nat-
ural world in the first place. As Lynch points out, the imagination functions 
as the bridging faculty, the link between nature and supemature and there-
fore a crucial factor in the discovery of truth and in the reconciliation of the 
divine and natural orders. 
This is the "realist paradigm" which Lynch posits as the fundamental in-
terpretive framework of the High Middle Ages. Writers of philosophical vi-
sions do not seek to repeat the paradigm, but to defend . it, to incorporate 
within its structures threatening ideas and experiences. Consequently, histori-
cal pressures exerted on any individual author result in a continuous as op-
posed to discontinuous change in the paradigm, and as the process of accom-
modation becomes more and more difficult with the emergence of new con-
flicting views and empirical data, the attempt takes the form of a 
reconsideration and restructuring of first principles. The philosophical vision, 
then, becomes a self-reflexive genre, rewriting the essential relations among 
imagination, memory, and reason. This view of an intellectually homogenous 
High Middle Ages, however, jeopardizes her historicism with the very essen-
tialism she claims to avoid. Although Lynch at times seems aware of this par-
adox, her efforts to eliminate it appear on a theoretical level of assertion, 
whereas in practice she casts an inevitable strain on her reading of individual 
works in order to justify and confirm her thesis. 
The most original and interesting aspect of the book lies in its exploration 
of medieval poetics, and Lynch supplies a much needed and desired analysis 
of period views of the imagination and the value of poetry. An obvious gap, 
given the stress on the theory of abstraction, lies in the absence of sustained 
discussion of memory, especially since the role of memory alters depending 
on whether one sees it in a Platonic or Aristotelian light. Platonic reminis-
cence may have been superseded by Aristotelian memory, but what then is 
the ordering function and role of Aristotelian memory? 
Imagination, however, gains in scope and importance in the thirteenth cen-
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tury, affecting the significance of its function in dreams, poetry, and the ac-
quisition of knowledge. Imagination's role in harmonizing nature (images of 
! I I I 
phenomena) and reason/supemature (knowledge of underlying order or i 
ideas in phenomenal images) is clear; without imagination, knowledge and ' 
harmony cannot take place. At the same time, imagination limits the intel-
lect, necessarily subjecting it to the world of the senses and to possible error, 
since the imagination can also produce false images in dreams or combine 
various sensaus impressions even in waking. The proper use of the imagina-
tion for medieval theorists lies not in its unrestrained capacity to formulate 
and store images, but in its service to reason; imagination has to be ordered 
to reason or intellect. In addition to the power of apprehension, imagination 
had other creative resources, which in the High Middie Ages, Lynch claims, 
grew in importance. In the first place, it was in itseif creative, capable of gen-
erating images, combining and recalling them without any stimulation from 
external senses, and to present them to other faculties of the mind for judge-
ment; creative images so ordered by reason imitate divine truth. Lynch no-
tices another related faculty, ingenium, sometimes conceived as part of imagi-
nation, and at other times a separate but associated faculty, endowed with 
perception, a prerational kind of understanding; for Dante, ingenio denotes 
the poetic power of fashioning comparisons or embodying ineffable ideas. 
Ingenium becomes an inspired facuity, informed by an ability to interpret 
both material and immaterial reality, similar to the modem idea of "genius" 
-the gift of poetic inspiration and invention (in the medieval sense of dis-
covery but also in the sense of the creation of prerational images). Working 
together with reason, it enables the poet to order or diScipline his subject 
matter in order to express through sensible images eternal truth. Writers of 
philosophical visions, Lynch implies, because of the new scope and function 
of imagination/ingenium, understand poetic art or "making" as analogous to 
God's creation: "Indeed, poetry's achievement grows not only out of the 
poet's intention to create discrete images of truth but also by the capacity of 
his narrative to create an order or sequence of experience that will allow the 
reader by the end of the work to abstract God's truth from poetic images as 
he does also from images in nature" (44). Philosophical visions present not 
oniy images but a process of vision, "an epistemological journey: imitative of 
the process of knowing. 
Lynch's reassessment of imagination suggests that medieval poets were not 
as rigid and as schematized as many have been led to believe, and the idea 
of a rational expressive creativity maintains historical difference without en-
tirely alienating medieval practitioners from later Hirrational' theories of cre-
ativity. "Genius" forms a bridge where before none existed. Lynch also shows 
that in many medieval texts of commentary and criticism-and significantly 
in many of the philosophical visions of her study-the word ingenium fre-
quently appears: in Dante, Alain, and Jean de Meun, for example. She argues 
cogently throughout that the allegorical figure "Genius: newly conceived by 
Alain and prominent in subsequent philosophical visions, combines genera-
tive force with ingenium, and that the imaginative knowing process culmi-
nates with the reconciliation inherent in this figure's nature and role. More-
over, this new dignity of imagination affects poetic and dream theories; Au-
gustine's visio spiritualis supplies a justifiable category of dream vision, 
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which imitates the epistemological journey and does so under the heightened 
activity of the imagination. The philosophical vision represents the perfect 
medium, where the redemption of the imagination, and therefore the bridge 
between nature and supernature, becomes both subject and form. Moreover, 
the reader, as he struggles with the dreamer in the attempt at understanding, 
participates in the epistemological experience, a formal poetic strength not 
available to philosophy, a means of effecting a rational/imaginative reconcili-
ation not possible in discursive prose. Lynch initiates in a sound and stimu-
lating manner a discourse of medieval imagination which promises to be-
come the focus of future students of medieval poetics. 
Lynch's model for the philosophical vision remains Boethius's Consolation 
of Philosophy, the standard model for most theories of medieval dream vision 
genre, as in the recent studies of J. Stephen Russell, The English Dream Vision, 
and Michael Cherniss, Boethian Apocalypse. Lynch differs from other readers 
in seeing the Consolation as an epistemological journey incorporating the 
theory of abstraction as an internal narrative structure, not simply a doctrine. 
Boethius addresses the problem of evil in a world created and governed by a 
good and rational God, and while he combines Platonic and Aristotelian con-
cepts of knowing, the problem of reconciliation, together with the suggestive 
but only partly realized Aristotelian solution, generates the subsequent re-
writing of later authors. Lady Phllosophy represents Reason and Archetypal 
Memory, and the narrator, initiating the generic role of subsequent dreamers 
in philosophical visions, represents the disordered or unredeemed human 
imagination, which undergoes "ordering." Personal worldy experience, natu-
ral images, and "wounded muses" form the opening perspective, and Lynch 
notes that subsequent philosophical visions similarly open with a luxuriance 
of images to a dreamer who lacks the strength of reason to interpret them 
correctly. At the end of the Consolation, the meaning of these "seminal 
images" becomes clarified, the growth of awareness in the increasingly 
healed dreamer sprouting from the seeds themselves. Although the final 
summation of truth is left to the prose of Lady Philosophy, the final four 
poems, spoken by the newly aware dreamer, offer an "emotional equivalent 
to reason" (73), images reflecting divine truth finally ordered by and aligned 
to Lady Philosophy. 
The other philosophical visions follow this model of the "natural" order of 
knowing, and each in turn attempts to modify and contemporize the resolu-
tions posited by Boethius in light of current epistemological challenges occa-
sioned by new strains placed on the theory of abstraction. Lynch's strategy is 
to examine the modulating shifts in allegorical figures and to discover the 
subsequent poetic thrust of imaging and imagining. Alain in De Planctu Na-
turae clarifies the Aristotelian metaphysical strain evident in Boethius by sub-
stituting Nature for Lady Philosophy. Here is no longer merely the voice of 
philosophical reason, but the voice of reason in nature; she represents, in 
other words, that reason which permits man to abstract truth from created 
nature. The dreamer's disordered imagination emerges in his opening confu-
sion, but also in the limitations naturally imposed on Nature in her initial 
reasonings; she is not so much a projection of the dreamer's unredeemed self 
as a figure limiting her discussion to the limited capacity of the dreamer. 
Alain's Genius effects the desired reconciliation. A symbol of natural genera-
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tive force, he also represents imagination aligned with Nature (Reason), his 
very presence indicating the epistemological progress of the dreamer. As a 
figure of imagination (genius/ingenium), Genius initiates the cognitive pro-
cess that culminates in the highest truths. De P!anctu rewrites the allegorical 
figure of Genius, and reformulates his role, for the doctrine Genius declares 
is not as important as the image he figures, and the resolution he effects de-
rives from his mythic and metaphorical aspects. Alain, Lynch suggests, con-
tinues the Boethian model in the direction of Aristotelian epistemology. 
Lynch sees Jean de Meun, Dante, and Gower facing serious problems with 
the model, marked by the Bishop Tempier's condemnation of 219 Averroistic 
and Aristotelian propositions in 1277. Philosophy with its "double truth" had 
gone too far in Tempier's view, and he narrowed the areas open to the explo-
rations of natural reason divorced from revelation and theology. Whether or 
not this directly led to the development of conceptualist logic which ulti-
mately defied and dismantled the claims of metaphysical reason is still de-
bated, but at the very least it casts doubt on the· possibility of human reason 
discovering eternal truth. Jean's answer, Lynch argues, was to suggest to 1·\1: 
Tempier that the abuse of reason, not reason itself, was to blame. His contin- 1,,1 
uation of the Roman de la Rose represents an adjustment of Guillaume's sec- , 
tion in the direction of the philosophical vision, but negatively conceived, for '.i • 1 
here we see the failure and not the achievement of vision. Lynch's analysis , 
here is sensitive and perceptive. Reason, rejected by Amans, nevertheless 
remains the only unquestioned authority figure in the poem. Genius and Na-
ture now reflect a disordered imagination which never emerges from confu-
sion, and consequently their arguments are incoherent, blasphemous, and 
frequently heretical, subscribing to many of the views condemned by Tem-
pier. Jean's revision of the dreamer also points to historical accommodation. 
He becomes a "cartoon nominalist" (126) who denies belief in any essential 
reality inhering in the thing itself, and who accepts the position that univer-
sals exist only in the mind. He shares the same kind of generic epistemologi-
cal failure as other dreamers, except in reverse. He overabstracts, rather than 
over-imagines, but because his abstractions have no concrete referent, his 
progress from image to abstraction is impossible, and he rejects Reason. The 
presence of Reason, however, indicates that rational study need not end this 
way, and that rational endeavors in themselves are not evil, but can lead to 
the evil of unrestrained eroticism when abused. This is an attractive reading, 
although one which rationalizes the ironies, contradictions, blasphemies, and 
anomalies of the Roman out of existence, depriving it of those tensions which 
to many are its very strengths. 
Dante and Gower represent conservative voices among the growing crowd 
of epistemological doubts which torment the fourteenth century, and both 
take up the issue of "misguided love" merged with the philosophical vision 
by Jean de Meun. Even though Dante dispenses with the familiar allegorical 
figures of Reason, Nature, or Genius, Purgatorio (9-27) represents "the most 
ambitious and confident history of a spiritual journey ever attempted" (146), 
a brilliant offensive maneuver in the midst of increasingly defensive tactics. 
Placed between the infernal region of unregenerate sin and corporeality and 
the paradisiacal region of beatitude, purgatory appropriately symbolizes the 
bridge between the two, and the location of Dante's regeneration of sight and 
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insight. Here Dante explores "earthly or human sins of the imagination" (152) 
and his pilgrim moves from misplaced imaginative desire at the Gates of Pur-
gatory to the inner rectitude of Earthly Paradise, guided by Virgil (reason) 
and then Beatrice. Three dream visions and an apostrophe to illuminated 
imagination (canto 17) confirm Lynch's reading of the subject and structure 
of this section, with its tribute to the powers of human apprehension stretch-
ing from the imagination to the stars. Gower, however, is more self-conscious 
and less confident, "re-visioning" (178) Jean's Genius in a manner both con-
firming and questioning the epistemological journey. A figure of disordered 
imagination at the beginning of the Confessio, Genius grows into ordered un-
derstanding, like Amans; "practice, effect, and intent have been out of 
balance" (196) throughout most of the poem, for Genius often misinterprets 
his exempla, the significance of which emerges by means of counterpointing 
stylistic foregrounding. Gower's Genius owes much to Jean's, except that he 
moves from order to disorder, and finally embodies the rationalized imagina-
tion necessary for the act of knowing and the consequent reconciliation of na-
ture and supemature. Gower's is a rearguard action, however, in the battle to 
save the theory of abstraction. Where Jean challenges opposition and Dante 
opposes it, Gower retreats into a nostalgic conservatism, unable to sustain 
convincingly a rapport between world and Word. 
The High Medieval Dream Vision erects a solid interdisciplinary edifice, a 
substantial overview of subgenre capable of locating and describing the inter-
nal structures and "mechanics" (8) of some of the most influential medieval 
works. Lynch's rational and historical analysis does justice to the philosophi-
cal nature of her thesis, although dispensing with differences and contradic-
tions which other critical perspectives might offer. Her bibliography is up to 
date and thorough, and her text virtually error-free, the only significant ex-
ception being the unfortunate phrase "unintelligible form" (31). At the same 
time, these remarks do not detract from the real achievement of Lynch's 
work. This is the kind of book on dream vision poetry medievalists have 
been waiting for, and it promises to initiate new directions by sparking chal-
lenge as well as continuation. 
Wilfrid Laurier University James F. G. Weldon 
The Death of Literature by Alvin Kernan. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1990. Pp. ix + 230. $22.50. 
Alvin Kernan's new book consists of eight miscellaneous chapters, framed 
by an Introduction and an Epilogue that carry the weight of the overall argu-
ment. The central topic that Kernan addresses is the large-scale, multifaceted 
institutional and cultural change of "the past thirty years" (p. 1), a time 
scheme that makes the 1960s the crucial turning point in the demise of the 
old order that prevailed "between the mid-eighteenth century and the mid-
twentieth" (pp. 5-6). The key question becomes: how does Kernan character-
ize the new situation in our current historical moment? 
Kernan's relation to the topic of cultural change is organized by his alterna-
UBi 
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tion between the two postures of journalist and prophet. In the former role, 
he parades a collection of contemporary symptoms in a breezy, cursory fash-
ion. His account of curricular change at Stanford is representative of the 
catchy, superficial style of tabloid reportage: 
In 1988, Stanford University, for example, made the front pages and 
the TV news programs with a debate about whether its reqUired course 
in great books, including many works of literature, should drop some 
of the classics, all written by "dead white males," to make room for the 
inclusion of books by women, blacks, and Third World writers. The 
great books which had hitherto formed the basis of liberal education 
were denounced as elitist, Eurocentric, and the tools of imperialism. 
Under this kind of pressure, the faculty and administration agreed to 
replace such writers as Homer and Dickens with books like Simone de 
Beauvoir's Second Sex. (pp. 3-4) 
As journalist, Kernan claims to be impartial: fI, •• It is as fact, not a judgment 
of what has happened, that they [the "new views"] are here described in as 
neutral a way as possible" (p. 2). But neutrality is not possible because Ker-
nan's vocabulary is loaded, negatively toned, and overwhelmingly alarmist. 
Moreover, as prophet, Kernan is anxious to render judgment. It is the affinity 
of the two roles of journalist and prophet that gives the book its flavor and 
structure: since both roles appeal to the same vocabulary, Kernan's voice 
readily slips back and forth between, and blends, the two perspectives. 
Kernan's journalistic function feeds his particular prophetic stance as a cul-
tural lamenter who tilts toward, sides with, the pessimists: "Even if Bennett, 
Hirsch, and Bloom are taken at something less than face value, the wide-
spread interest in their views testifies to a general concern that book culture, 
of which literature is a central part, is disappearing, and with it many of soci-
ety's central values" (pp. 4-5). The "many optimists who see a new and better 
literary system arising phoenixlike from the ashes of the old" are dismissively 
undercut by withering mock-heroic parody: "This redirection of literature is 
perceived by its supporters as a giant step for humankind" (p. 5). Kernan's 
preoccupation is rather with the ashes, as the central image of death in the 
book's title insists. Death may not be too strong a term to evoke the magni-
tude of the cultural change we are going through, but Kernan misidentifies its 
referent. It is not literature that has died, but rather a set of literary critical 
habits. 
Death in this latter sense is exemplified by Kernan's discussion of Norman 
Mailer (pp. 204-205, 207), who symbolizes the artist's inability to recover 
from" a crisis of confidence in the traditional values of literature" (p. 3). Even 
more striking than his selection of Mailer as an index of cultural health is 
Kernan's refusal to look elsewhere, further afield. Kernan's image of death 
applies to a limited range of literature that has disappOinted him. However, 
rather than explore new literary territory, Kernan places a self-imposed re-
striction on the intellectual field he is willing to encompass and gives himself 
over to mourning. How does Kernan back himself into a comer in which the 
elegiac mode appears the only palatable option? Why is despair preferable to 
expanding the range of literary material? 
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Contrary to Kernan's position, literature is very much alive. But its life has 
shifted in large measure to emergent minority literatures. The most important 
and powerful literary experiences I have had during the past decade have 
come from such writers, to name only an abbreviated short list, as Rita Dove, 
june jordan, Paule Marshall, Toni Morrison, Gloria Naylor, Alice Walker; 
Paula Gunn Allen, Louise Erdrich, Joy Harjo, Linda Hogan, Leslie Marmon 
Silko; joy Kogawa, Yoshiko Uchida. Such writers are now carriers of the val-
ues that Kernan cherishes and thinks have disappeared: "the belief in writing 
and creating art as near sacred callings, the visionary power of the imagina-
tion, the perfect form and the truth of the literary text ... " (p. 203). One rea-
son that Kernan cannot acknowledge the massive shift of cultural energy rep-
resented by the extraordinary growth of minority literatures is that this re-
alignment has occurred on a scale not envisioned in the standard formulation 
of literary tradition given by T.5. Eliot in "Tradition and the Individual 
Talent" and duly cited by Kernan (p. 14). Kernan can neglect major new liter-
ary developments only by seeing them as noncanonical, inferior, and inci-
dental. This perception is implied by the ominous, condensed allusion to 
"less prestigious writings" in the counterpointing of "traditional intellectual 
qualities represented by the classics of literature versus social values of equal-
ity of gender and race represented by less prestigious writings" (p. 4). Or wit-
ness the offhand gesture to "writings by blacks and authors of various ethnic 
origins, not previously considered significant enough to be included in the 
official literary canon" (p. 86). These phrases are based on a. conspicuously 
unexamined assumption; their claim to validity rests on Kernan's avoidance 
and ignorance of the literature he classifies as unworthy. 
A similar technique of avoidance is apparent in Kernan's treatment of femi-
nism as a critical approach. His repeated references to feminism demonstrate 
no attempt at scholarly investigation, no pretense of serious acquaintance 
with different kinds of feminist literary criticism. Instead, Kernan uses the 
term "feminism" as a code word in expectation of a simple stock response. 
As Kernan's invocation of the word "positive" three times on his final page 
(p. 213) indicates, the outcome of feminist criticism is in his view negative: 
"Give away, lose, or discredit these texts-Homer, Shakespeare, Balzac-and 
literature is out of business" (p. 212). The basic assumption is that sharply to 
criticize literature is to empty out and nullify it. I dispute this view. Feminist 
criticism of Shakespeare, for instance, is both thriving and positive. Feminist 
critical negotiations with Shakespeare's texts offer not the meretricious exhil-
aration Kernan alleges, but rather a responsible and culturally vital process of 
reassessment in the context of a greatly expanded and diversified literary 
field. However, the positive implications emerge fully only when one is will-
ing to recognize and actively to engage this newly enlarged field. 
Clark Art Institute Peter Erickson 
'fHn 
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Alternate Worlds: A Study of Postmodern Antirealistic American Fiction by John 
Kuehl. With an Introduction and Interview by James Tuttleton. New York: 
New York University Press, 1989. Pp. 373. $50.00. 
When the American postmodemist novel is taught in other than graduate 
classes or seminars in postmodemism, the selections tend to have a predicta-
ble sameness. Favored works are the short, accessible texts that can readily 
serve as "samplers" to the contemporary antirealists, arguably our most bril-
liant, but also irksome group of prose fiction writers. Hesitant to confront the 
novels by William Gaddis, Thomas Pynchon, and Joseph McElroy that reach 
nearly one-thousand pages, many readers are left to judge antirealism by the 
more approachable books like Robert Coover's Pricksongs and Descants rather 
than his full-length The Public Burning; Pynchon's short novel, The Crying of 
Lot 49, rather than his encyclopedic Gravity's Rainbow; Barth's conservative 
The End of the Road and The Floating Opera rather than his massive self-re-
flexive Letters; and Gaddis's recent Carpenter's Gothic instead of his sprawling 
The Recognitions or his largely auditory novel, J R. Reading some of the anti-
realistic novels is, of course, better than reading none of them; but the as-
sumptions drawn from a few cautious selections produce a partial, and thus 
slanted, perspective of these formidable works of fiction. 
Alternate Worlds is an impressive study that works to enlarge that perspec-
tive. Rather than devote each chapter to a specific author, which would have 
the effect of separating the discussions, Kuehl has organized eleven chapters 
according to features that recur within a given range of authors and novels. 
The advantage of this arrangement is twofold. First, Kuehl is able to examine 
in adequate detail a long list of contemporary novels. A sense of coherence 
and cohesiveness thus emerges across the postmodemist canon since this for-
mat emphasizes similarities among works that might otherwise appear diver-
gent. Second, the arrangement allows for analysis of less read and less 
known works. Included here are Colman Dowell's Island People, Susan Son-
tag's Death Kit, Alexander Theroux's Darconville's Cat, and Joseph McElroy's 
Hind's Kidnap. . 
Kuehl's working definition of antirealism also helps the study to present a 
balanced and expansive view of the subject. Defining antirealism as "the 
whole body of nonimitative writing, including earlier domestic instances and 
an adversarial stance towards what many besides F. R. Leavis consider the 
great realistic tradition," Kuehl includes, but does not limit his analysis to de-
vices such as self-reflexivity or linguistic play that are most commonly asso-
ciated with the genre. He examines a span of antirealistic novels, and texts 
that contain antirealistic qualities, while reaching as far back as Augustan sat-
ire and Cervantes' Don Quixote. Although Alternate Worlds concentrates on 
American antirealism since World War II, using upostmodern" to stress its 
contemporary qualities and distinguish it from Joycean and Proustian Mod-
ernism, the study consistently points to the continuity, richness, and interna-
tional scope of antirealism. Working within that tradition, Kuehl can examine 
Nathanael West's treatment of the grotesque in Miss Lonelyhearts alongside 
Hawkes's grotesque characters in The Cannibal with sidelong glances at Colo-
nial and American Transcendentalist varieties of the literary grotesque. link-
ing the early examples in this instance to "an artistic mode already prominent 
i 
J 
Criticism, Vol. XXXIII, No.2: Book Reviews 267 
in the Middle Ages: Kuehl contextualizes, and traditionalizes, what often 
looks to readers to be wildly radical or impenetrable novels. 
Kuehl's secondary purpose is to position antirealism on a paraliel track 
with contemporary American realism as practiced by Updike, Styron, Bellow, 
and Roth. These writers have worked their way with relative ease into a na-
tional consciousnesses as well as slipped into a dominant place in the Ameri-
can canon. In the meantime, antirealism has remained submerged in the can-
on's undercurrents, from where it surfaces intermittently, but more generally 
keeps to its own metalinguistic, metafictional involutions. 
As Kuehl indicates in his Preface, his strategy is essentially explication de 
texte. A critical approach that has been overwhelmed by political, psychologi-
cal, and numerous other approaches, explication de texte-despite questions 
surrounding the validity of objective, universal standards-is precedential to 
the other approaches, especially because antirealism is so difficult. Just as 
Eliot's The Waste Land was driven through decades of New Criticism before it 
would yield to psychobiographical and poststructuralist interpretations, these 
antirealistic works-which incorporate elements designed to stymie readers 
(Latin passages printed backwards), to scandalize them (scatological refer-
ences) and to repel them (misogyny)-requlre the most essential of critical 
tasks-to be read, then held up to a variety of critical approaches. 
Each of the interior chapters of Alternate Worlds centers on a specific formal 
or rhetorical mode: reflexivity, the ludic impulse, maximalism vs. minimal-
ism, decentralization, the grotesque and diabolical, imaginary landscapes, ab-
surd quests, fictitious history, conspiracy and paranoia, entropy, and night-
mare/apocalypse. The chapter on ludic elements, for instance, examines Gil-
bert Sorrentino's Splendid-Hotel and Mulligan Stew, William Gass' Willie 
Masters' Lonesome Wife, and Walter Abish's Alphabetical Africa. Kuehl exam-
ines the last text for its limiting, though curiously liberating form. Relying on 
alphabetical order, Abish uses only NaN words in the first chapter, 'aN and "b' 
words in the second, etc., until he reaches the end of the alphabet when he 
reverses the pattern in subsequent chapters and returns to 'AN. Also citing 
strategies structured on games like chess and baseball to experimental typog-
raphy, the chapter offers a way into the novels of Abish, Gass, Sorrentino, 
Federman, Coover, Barthelme and Theroux by connecting their strategies and 
spirit of play. 
The arrangement of sections is both traditional and unorthodox. The Intro-
duction of Alternate Worlds, nearly sixty pages in length and written by James 
Tuttleton, traces the development of American antirealism throughout the 
nineteenth century. Entitled 'The American Roots of Contemporary Antireal-
ism: this section often invokes Poe, Irving, and Melville for early examples 
of postrnodernist qualities such as fictitious histories, reflexive designs, and 
fantastic landscapes. Tuttleton's section, packed with literary/historical infor-
mation, is an intriguing and useful addition to the book. It reiterates the point 
that postrnodernist devices are not sudden inventions by postwar writers but 
the creative refashioning of elements previously used, though perhaps less 
extensively, by earlier writers. Thus, Barthelme's minimalism looks back to 
the imagist minimalism of Crane's The Red Badge of Courage as the maximal-
ist impulses in Pynchon's and Gaddis's works recall such massive novels as 
Stowe's Uncle Tom's Cabin, De Forest's Miss Ravenel's Conversion from Seces-
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sian to Loyalty and, of course, Melville's Moby-Dick. Kuehl's interior chapters 
build from Tuttleton's Introduction, and gradually the differences between 
nineteenth-century and tw-entieth-century antirealism emerge. These differ-
ences become most emphatic in the final section of Alternate Worlds, which is 
an extended dialogue between Kuehl and Tuttleton. 
For the most part, the question/answer format of the last section elucidates 
two points of view. Drawing Alternate Worlds back into the history of the an-
tirealistic narrative, the section pitches the expectations, purpose, and socio-
political implications of realism and antirealism against each other. The anti-
realists' enjoyment of gameplaying, for instance, operates through their treat-
ing history as fiction and fiction as history while sometimes conjoining both 
into nightmare or hallucination. The blurring of meaningful distinctions un-
derscores the ambiguous relationship between writer and reader. What infer-
ences do the postmodern antirealists wish their readers to draw? What di-
vides their mock-heroic, anti-institutional, educational, humanistic stance 
from nihilism? As Tuttleton queries Kuehl, if antirealists disassemble all 
forms of order to proffer alternate visions that are as violent and oppressive 
as the "objective" world which they reject, they will gradually lose their read-
ership. Acknowledging the problem of audience and the disturbing prepon-
derance of misogyny, fanaticism, even savagery, Kuehl generally defends 
these "alternate worlds," which are nevertheless dazzling creations that en-
gage readers in formidable intellectual challenges. 
The writers whom Kuehl examines are most often male, and his distin-
guishing between twentieth-century "masculine" and "feminine" antirealism 
is a point well taken, one offering provocative areas of investigation for other 
critics, who often ignore the tradition of women's postmodemism. If writers 
like West, Hawkes and Burroughs exhibit dislike or deprecating humor to-
wards the functioning of the human body, others like AnaYs Nin, H. D., and 
Kathy Acker revere or luxuriate in the body, particularly the female body, 
and often move towards female friendship and community. With the differ-
ences between the male and female experimental tradition as complex as 
those between the realist and antirealist traditions, Alternate Worlds, in pro-
gressing through a plethora of information, is a stimulating and comprehen-
sive study which poses essential questions that reach across a century of 
prose fiction in America. The structure, approach, and analyses of Alternate 
Worlds both elucidate and challenge the writers who are its subject. 
University of Hawaii Miriam Fuchs 
The Mode of Information. Poststructuralism and Social Context by Mark Poster. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990. Pp. 179. $29.95, cloth; 
$10.95, paper. 
The excitement and difficulties that Mark Poster's latest study generates 
arise from his bold attempt to define "a theory able to decode the linguistic 
dimension of the new forms of social interaction" occasioned by electronic 
communication, Le. the "mode of information" (5), at the core of which he 
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sees the representative capabilities of language, transformed by diverse 
realms of communication (the media, data bases, state and corporate surveil-
lance, scientific discourses). Organizing his study around the transformative 
impact of and on language within these four regions, Poster follows what he 
calls the Ndouble imperative" (18) of shuttling between, on one hand, particu-
lar poststructuralist positions that reveal "the self-referential linguistic 
mechanisms" at work in the four aforementioned "sectors of electronically 
mediated communication" and, on the other, these sectors themselves and 
their subversion of the "authority effects of the poststructuralist position" 
(18). By linking "sectors" to theoretical positions-TV ads to Baudrillard 
(chapter 2), databases to Foucault (chapter 3), electronic writing to Derrida 
(chapter 4), scientific discourse to Lyotard (chapter 5)-, Poster hopes to call 
attention to the new features of "the contemporary social space," to modes of 
analyzing it, and to the disruptive potential of the theoretical concepts that 
his study foregrounds. 
A powerful statement mid-way through the book both articulates Poster's 
understanding of the unique phenomena that the "mode of information" ini-
tiates for all language forms, and points to the central inconsistency of his 
study: by undermining Nthe time/space coordinates that have been employed 
to fix language in various contexts," the IImode of information" lIopens up an 
understanding of language and society that has no reference in the grid of 
Renaissance perspective or the mimetic realism of Enlightenment reason." 
While both speech and writing N are available to logics of representation,N 
"electronic language, on the contrary, does not lend itself to being so framed. 
It is everywhere and nowhere, always and never. It is truly material/ 
immaterial" (85). This statement, and others like it, are at once stimulating 
and disturbing since a project like Poster's, grounding itself in chapter 1 in a 
strong critique of the misprision of the Ntotalizing forms of discourse" (nota-
bly, Frankfurt School neoMarxism, Daniel Bell, and Habermas) on which 
postindustrial theories of society rely, would seemingly be adequately self-
reflexive to avoid moves toward totalizing its own critical approach. How-
ever, just as I appreciate enormously the theoretical breakthrough that Poster 
attempts, it is often difficult to see how the "mode of information" constitutes 
any more than another totalizing analytical framework, plugged into the 
most recent critical discourse, to be sure, but for that all the more unconvinc-
ing. 
Indeed, it is not clear in some instances how the "mode of information" 
provides a fundamentally useful vantage point for the critical perspectives 
that it seeks to open. For example, after detailing in chapter 2 the limitations 
of various approaches to the study of the Nmode of information"'s most 
unique form, the TV ad, Poster points to Baudrillard's critique of the political 
economy of the sign and to his later exploration of the destabilizing and sim-
ulating effects of communication (the Nhyperreal") as contributing to the 
"mode of information"'s delineation. Yet, to counter what Poster maintains is 
the "hyperreal"'s totalizing position that "forecloses the possibility of new 
movementsN (66), the "mode of information" would ostensibly provide a cru-
cial understanding of the receiver's dual self-constituting role and decentered 
position as Nsubject/object of the message" (67). While Poster's analysis cer-
tainly opens up the relationship of vie",.rer to the viewed, particularly to TV 
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ads, in ways unexplored by previous critical approaches, what advantage this 
insight might yield for further analysis is left undecided, even undecidable. 
For the destabilized, active/passive viewer role points to simultaneous and 
conflicting possibilities in "the media region of the mode of information/' on 
one hand, of extending "the domain of unfreedom by the linguistic constitu-
tion of consumer subjects," on the other, of opening "discourse to a new level 
of freedom by deconstructing all forms of centered subjects" (68). 
Moreover, in contrast to the instability of the subject/object of electroni-
cally mediated communications is the oddly unitary form of subjectivity ex-
ploited by databases and surveillance regimes that emerges in chapter 3. 
Calling upon Foucault's work on prisons in order better to emphasize the 
emergent capabilities of the data-based "Superpanopticon" in which we are 
currently immersed, "a means of controlling masses in the postmodem, post-
industrial mode of information" (97), Poster's "uncomfortable discovery" 
through discourse analysis "that the population participates in its own self-
constitution as subjects of the normalizing gaze of the Superpanopticon" (97) 
is all the more uncomfortable since the destabilized, fraclured subject/object 
of the televisual exchange is nonetheless controlled en masse, in totality, by 
the effective manipulation of the "mode of information" itself. And again, 
what is gained by Poster's skillful rapprochement between Foucault's analy-
sis and the databased technology if the only "oppositional strategy" proposed 
to counter the threat of "Superpanoptic" control is Lyotard's plea, '''give the 
pUblic free access to the memory and data banks'" (98), that Poster finally 
dismisses as not advancing "very far in the direction of postrnodem justice" 
(154)? 
However, in the shuttle diplomacy in chapter 4, between the sector of elec-
tronic writing and Derrida's conceptions of writing and context, Poster pro-
vides one of the most important readings to date of deconstruction, 
"extracting it from the context of philosophical and literary texts and reinsert-
ing it in the social context of computer writing" so as better to contribute to 
critical social theory's "reconstructive task of analyzing later twentieth-cen-
tury society" (110). Unsurprisingly, given the theoretical position under scru-
tiny, undecidability rears its pixeled head in the form of the decentering ef-
fects of computer writing on individual subjectivity, dispersed across bulletin 
boards and destabilized by new protocols of conferencing networks. Poster 
concludes that Derrida's concept of "writing" and the anti-Iogocentric princi-
ple that it contains are placed entirely into question by the evanescent marks 
or traces of computer writing that instantiates "the play deconstruction raises 
only as a corrective, albeit a fundamental one, against the hubris of logo-
centrism" (128). Furthermore, Poster extends this insightful analysis in chap-
ter 5 by exploring the question of how to theorize the political in the "mode 
of information" in relation to scientific discourse. After situating the post-
structuralist thinkers in the context of May '68 and its aftermath in order to 
trace the political directions of the poststructuralist mediation on language, 
Poster unfortunately provides entirely too little evidence of what he deems 
suspicious in Deleuze and Guattari's "hermeneutic of desire," and thereby 
diminishes important insights that A Thousand Plateaus might provide for the 
study of cybernetics. Still, Poster emphasizes more fully the role that lan-
guage plays in L yotard' s works (particularly, The Postmodern Condition and 
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The Differend) and in Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's project, and inter-
rogates the role that science can have when its project has been delegitimized 
by the critique of "grand narratives" and "when electronic means of generat-
ing and disseminating science become available and are practiced" (144). 
Having located Lyotard's ambivalence towards and cursory treatment of the 
computerization of science, Poster then undertakes a fascinating, if somewhat 
brief, reflection on the discursive role of cybernetics in science. 
The importance of Poster's book is unmistakable for he skillfully negotiates 
between and juxtaposes two wide theoretical domains-electronically me-
diated communications and poststructuralist theory-about which much has 
been written, but hardly with the acumen that he brings to bear in a long-
awaited critical rapprochement. In my remarks, I have meant to engage his 
work on its own terrain, but there. is no doubt that this opening sally into the 
no longer speculative field of the "mode of information," whatever the con-
tradictions that Poster raises without fully resolving, establishes a fertile 
ground for further research on the relation of electronically mediated com-
munication to social theory. 
Wayne State University Charles J. Stivale 
Subversive Pleasures: Bakhtin, Cultural Criticism and Film by Robert Starn. Bal-
timore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989. Pp. xiii + 274. $28.50. 
Robert Starn's often brilliant study persuasively demonstrates the useful-
ness bf Bakhtinian theory to contemporary film study and cultural criticism. 
A number of film scholars have applied Bakhtin's ideas to particular issues in 
film study: Vivian Sobchack writing on film noir or Dana Polan on spectacle 
are only two critics who have shown the efficacy of Bakhtinian concepts in 
the practice of film criticism. Starn's book, however, is the first sustained ef-
fort to provide theoretical grounding for such practice. At the same time, Sub-
versive Pleasures implicitly critiques the dominant parochialism of contempo-
rary film study with the bracing eclecticism of its method. Both for its basic 
enterprise of installing Bakhtin as a touchstone for film scholars and for its 
rangy, intellectually restless methodological alternative to the constricting 
specialization of current film theory, Starn's book is among the most impor-
tant recent contributions to film study. 
These two tendencies of the book are, in fact, closely allied. The appeal of 
Bakhtin, according to Starn, is that he prefigures crucial elements of post-
structural thought, always fore grounding the centrality of language in human 
interaction, while rejecting the insular qualities of the extreme, separate 
branches of that thought: Bakhtin's formulations "have the advantage of not 
restricting liberatory struggle to purely economic or political battles; instead 
they extend it to the common patrimony of the utterance ... Discursive rela-
tionships, in this perspective, can be deciphered as micro historical encoun-
ters"(8). More specifically, the openness of Bakhtin's categories have the ca-
pacity to "deprovincialize a film-critical discourse too often tied to nine-
teenth-century European conventions of verisimilitude"(9). Thus, the claim of 
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Bakhtinian theory to tum outward toward dialogue with other theories is re-
flected in Starn's encyclopedic deployment of the terms of semiotics, psycho-
analysis, Marxism. Unlike, say, Kristin Thompson, who at the outset of 
Breaking the Class Armor: NeoFormalist Film Analysis (1988) specifically rejects 
the possibility of Formalism's engaging in "dialogue" with psychoanalysis 
and "materialism" (p. 28), Starn repeatedly insists upon such dialogue among 
styles of discourse, thereby producing a book that emblematizes the dialogic 
imagination in the very structure of its argument. Starn's book moves with 
agility among styles of thinking not to "synthesize" them but to re-think his 
own position from multiple vantage points. Starn has seemingly read every-
thing and knows how to bring adjacent critical traditions into alliance with-
out forcing one to bow to the others. If this book's immense learning and the 
way it is marshaled are accorded the attention they should be, the wide-
spread disdain for eclecticism in film study should be finally banished. Only 
rarely does Starn fall into some of critical pluralism's traps, as when he as-
signs the too-specific term of another writer to an ,insufficiently defined con-
text. One of Starn's favorite rhetorical maneuvers, in fact, repeatedly indulges 
in this tendency: "In the age of what Karen Jaehne calls the 'Great Detumesc-
ence .. "(170); ". in the era of what Arthur Kroker calls 'panic sex' 
... "(171); " ... outside what Stephen Heath calls 'the sexual fix'"(177); " ... 
what Meeghan Morris [sic] calls 'the cheerleaders' and the 'prophets of 
doom,'" (220) and so on, where in each case the needed term is smuggled in 
a bit too handily. Elsewhere, Starn makes too-easy equivalencies between 
complex terms, as when he conflates Bakhtin's dialogism with Kristeva's in-
tertext (17). For the most part, though, the book is a model of how to validate 
theory as a critical activity without pledging allegiance to a single theory. If 
film scholarship is ever to lift itself from the categorical exclusionism in 
which it is mired, Subversive Pleasures should serve as the vanguard. 
The book's first two chapters deal with the trope of film language, arguing 
for the applicability of Bakhtin's work to film by demonstrating the entrench-
ment of that trope in film theory from Eisenstein to Metz and beyond. As al-
ways, however, Starn is concerned with widening the boundaries of particu-
lar discourses, de-centering the usual semiotic thrust of such discussions by 
introducing concepts of "translinguistics" as well as of difference and power: 
For Bakhtin, "even consciousness is linguistic, and therefore social, and thus 
an objective fact and a social force. . The Bakhtinian conception of lan-
guage, then, constitutes a vehicle for avoiding the trap of mechanistic 
economism"(32). One problem with this section of the book is precisely its 
emphasis on Bakhtin's philosophy of language: I am not unconvinced that 
translinguistics "allows" the application of Bakhtin's theory to non-novelistic 
genres, but I wonder why Starn has chosen not to discuss at greater length 
Bakhtin's theory of genre itself. In "Discourse in the Novel," Bakhtin opens 
up the genre to such an extent that it becomes all-embracing, readily admit-
ting film. (Michael Holquist speaks of "the novel's intensifying anti-generic 
power" in Bakhtin's work.) At the same time, such an emphasis might have 
led Starn to come fully to terms with Bakhtin's incipient Formalism, for the 
traces of which Starn harbors obvious distaste. Still, Bakhtin frequently finds 
himself on what Starn would call the wrong side of the Formalist distinction 
between literary and non-literary discourse: "Literary language is a highly 
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distinctive phenomenon," he claims in The Dialogic Imagination (p. 294, 
where he develops the argument fully). Given this distinction redolent of the 
Formalist heritage, the question becomes how it problematizes Bakhtin's 
privileging of the "folk" with their carnivalesque rejections of the officially lit-
erary. 
Starn is certainly aware of all the potential problems in Bakhtin's work, 
and he deals with this one to his own satisfaction in his introduction (p. 20). 
The third, fourth, and fifth chapters of the book, less concerned with Bakh-
tin's theories as such, apply them to such phenomena as the carnival in art-
cinema, the marginal status of Latin American film, and porn films. These are 
the most successful sections of the book, and the vital, deeply affectionate 
chapter on Brazilian cinema should certainly bring this important "Third 
Cinema" into the purview of American film study. Starn's Bakhtin is an in-
vigoratingly Utopian figure, unleashing repressed energies, redeeming the 
marginalized, and triumphantly bridging the "immense gap between left cul-
tural criticism and the people it purports to serve"(238). (Who, I wonder?) If 
this reading of Bakhtin's multi-vocality leads Starn to some embarrassing ex-
cesses-his tinny-sounding and decidedly non-hip effort to appear with-it by 
congratulating Melvin Van Peebles on his ability to "get down and talk 
black"(82)-it must also account for the extraordinary power of his commen-
tary on, for example, the Brazilian chanchada. Here Starn explores cultural 
attitudes that might easily be exoticized, constructed as Other, but with Bakh-
tin's help Starn constructs them as genuinely egalitarian, liberational, Uto-
pian. This section of the book is the most persuasive that Bakhtin's theory 
can do what Starn claims it can do: negotiate difference and transform it into 
a form of identification. 
Moreover, an understanding of Bakhtin's multi-vocality enables Starn to 
discuss pornography with none of the shrillness, the evangelism, or the true-
confessions ardor frequently attendant upon such analysis. Although not 
comparable in scope to Linda Williams's recent work on pornography, Starn's 
chapter not only designates some of the crucial features of porn-as-genre, but 
also tests those theories by pointing to the simulacra of them offered by porn: 
"It is useful to regard porn, I think, as an 'ersatz' or 'degraded' carnival, one 
that capitalizes on the repressed desire for carnival-style eroticism by serving 
up the simulacrum of its utopian promise"(169). 
This problem of the uses of carnival in political contexts is one I am not 
sure Starn (or Bakhtin) has sufficiently traced. What about texts that mimic 
features of carnival while legislating against the aims of openness or of liber-
ationism? Starn mentions in passing the Bakhtinian resonances of T. S. Eliot's 
thought; and in fact, Eliot's work foregrounds parody and popular forms 
such as the music-hall tradition; it sets multiple textual registers into allusive 
juxtaposition; its reflexivity is densely ironic; it deals repeatedly with 
masques and pageants-yet nobody would call Eliot's a "dialogic imagina-
tion." Although Starn warns repeatedly against "essentializing" Bakhtin, I 
can't help feeling there must be some essential attribute-the text's position-
ing of its own accessibility, perhaps-of the dialogic text, the absence of 
which makes Eliot's work "authoritative discourse" (Bakhtin's term) in spite 
of its dialogic surface. 
This problem is most troubling in the chapter in which Starn turns his sus-
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tained attention to a single text, Woody Allen's Zelig. Since Stam emphasizes 
throughout the book the politically oppositional potential of Bakhtin's ideas, 
the choice of this text for prolonged analysis seems to me quite odd indeed. 
Hardly an example of "popular culture," Allen's hectic catalogue of styles is a 
wan burlesque haunted by High Modernism on the one hand (personified by 
S. Sontag, I. Howe, S. Bellow) and the art-cinema tradition on the other. Far 
from being the spontaneous interaction in the spirit of free contact Bakhtin 
celebrates, the incorporation of these diverse styles is self-consciously tor-
tured and anxiety-ridden, the mirror of Zelig's own "problem." Further, the 
text is dogged by intense body-hatred: as homophobic as all Allen's films, 
this one decrees the validity of exactly one sexual practice and regards all 
others with disgust. Finally, the conception of the populace that emerges 
from the film is akin to the High Modernist dread of mass culture: Zelig's 
chameleonic tendencies do not celebrate but mock the possibility of negotiat-
ing difference and, though to an extent lesser than in Stardust Memories, the 
"carnivals" in which the masses threateningly congregate are marked by their 
unbending alterity: the Philistines, Allen wants us to know, are at the gates. 
My disagreement with Starn here may be a matter of interpretation, but I 
think it grows from Starn's treatment of tradition as a concept. Although 
Starn suggests that Bakhtin was not hostile to modernism, as was Georg 
Lukacs, it is still true that the traditions Bakhtin favored are notably pre-
modern. In fact, the one "modernist" Bakhtin devotes some attention to is the 
same one Lukacs was able to tolerate, Thomas Mann. Moreover, Bakhtin's 
rejection of Fonnalism may have been tantamount to a critique of modernism 
because of the deep alliance between Formalism and the cultural avant-garde 
of the early twentieth-century. If Formalism is designed specifically to deal 
with the shifting assumptions of literary modernism, are those concepts of 
Bakhtin's most inimical to Formalism equipped to deal with these assump-
tions in any way? Starn begins to treat these issues: carnival is "the Bakh-
tinian category most susceptible to co-optation"(94); "In the modernist pe-
riod, carnival ceases to be a collective cleanSing ritual open to all people and 
becomes the instrument of a marginalized caste"(98). But to show repeatedly 
how Bui\uel, Wertmuller, Monty Python, Woody Allen and others are part of 
a "larger" Menippean tradition is at least in part to deny what is decisively 
modernist in their orientation. All this is only to say that I wish Starn's book, 
for all its brilliance, and especially given Bakhtin's reticence on the matter, 
had more fully contextualized Bakhtin's answerability to the polyvalent but 
autotelic strategies of historical modernism-or their answerability to him. 
North Carolina State University James Morrison 
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Deleuze and Guattari, by Ronald Bogue. New York and London: Routledge, 
1989. Pp. 196. $42.50. $16.95 (paper). 
Many graduate students and established scholars in the human sciences 
have difficulty with the terminolOgical swirls and the subversion of conven-
tional academic decorum in the two volumes by the philosopher Gilles De-
leuze and the psychoanalyst Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand 
Plateaus, both subtitled Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Ronald Bogue's Deleuze 
and Guattari attempts to map those swirls and disruptions. Bogue's aim is in 
part to clarify the extent to which their tactics illustrate rather than obscure 
their strategy, which may be defined as a radical transvaluation of conven-
tional models of human consciousness, language and culture, as they are ap-
plied in philosophy, literary studies, psychoanalysis and politics. 
Deleuze and Guattari is an ambitious project, especially when one considers 
the danger of reduction common to introductory texts, a reduction apparent 
in other recent introductions that explain continental philosophy while fol-
lowing the perhaps necessary Anglo-American analytic bias toward simplic-
ity and clarity that is not shared by the works being described. 
Happily, Ronald Bogue succeeds in this exposition of the works of Deleuze 
and Guattari because he makes good on three claims. First, Bogue insists on 
the continuity and coherence of Deleuze's early studies of "marginal" West-
ern philosophers and on "minor" literary figures. Bogue then demonstrates 
that continuity by tracing the genealogy of key terms and concepts from De-
leuze's early works to Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus, as if his philos-
ophy were systematic. In fact, half the book is devoted to Deleuze's early 
work, and anything that might get lost in Bogue's reconstruction is more than 
balanced by his accessible exposition of the evolution of concepts addressed 
in these works, concepts that are often arcane (e.g. Plato's simulacrum; the 
Stoics' incorporeals and bodies; Nietzsche's Eternal Return), and subtle (e.g. 
nomad; rhizome; body without organs; desiring machines). At the same time, 
Bogue is carefui to emphasize that Deleuze's series of studies, including the 
collaborative works, must be construed as "works of art .... a creative and 
ongoing production of interconnections, not the revelation of a prevenient 
whole." If the development of concepts in these works is not systematic, it is 
perhaps organic, even self-organizing in a rigorous sense not yet understood. 
Second, Bogue refuses to underestimate Guattari's contribution to Anti-
Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus. Specifically, Bogue finds prominent in 
these volumes Guattari's clinically as well as theoretically informed theory of 
group subjectivity, a subjectivity that has "its own laws ... forms of resis-
tance, transference, fantasy." In other words, Guattari's theory of group sub-
jectivity is a macroscopic formuiation, a political unconscious (to which Fred-
rich Jameson owes much) that may be analyzed through an exploded model 
of "desiring-production" that draws on (yet completely reformulates in a 
Nietzschean context) Marxist and Freudian models and terminology. In Anti-
Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus, Guattari's theory of group subjectivity is 
merged with Deleuze's science of beCOming, a theory of "what is possible" 
applied in earlier works not only to Proust's obsession with signs, memory 
w 
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and the contingency of time, but to Sacher-Masoch's explorations of the lim-
its of desire and the law. This science of becoming has its roots in the physis 
of Nietzsche's affirmative nihilism, a theory of difference rooted in physics, 
not semiology, a theory of forces articulated through the seminal concepts 
"will to power" and the "Eternal Return." These concepts are developed first 
in Deleuze's study Nietzsche and Philosophy, and then explored further in a 
series of imaginative studies of thought, signs, subjectivity and cultural pat-
ternings in philosophers and literary figures: Spinoza, Bergson, Proust, 
Sacher-Masoch, the Stoics, Kant, Kafka, Marx and Freud. 
According to Deleuze, Nietzsche's "'will to power" determines the relation-
ship between "the active and reactive qualities of force" that involves both 
discourse and the body, and yet which is independent of force itself. It is "the 
power of becoming that plays through forces, differentiating them and link-
ing them both spatially and temporally." The active is pure becoming; the re-
active functions to constrain, to establish limits on what is active. In human 
consciousness, the reactive emerges as ressentiment; in culture, the reactive 
assumes all forms of repression, control, management, ideology. Far from 
being a cyclical theory of history (as with Spengler), The Eternal Return des-
ignates a return to becoming and difference, not being and sameness. The 
Eternal Return affirms the always-already contingency of past and future, as 
it is reformulated in every present moment: a "world of flux and multiplici-
ty," the Eternal Return" defines becoming as "chance or chaos," which in tum 
is motivated by the "will to power." 
In addition, Bogue discusses at length Deleuze and Guattari's study Kafka: 
For a Minor Literature, in which they apply their Nietzschean theory of the 
nomad as an aleatory subject in a social field defined as a chaos of desire and 
contingency, objectified by simulacra, and constrained by cultural and psy-
chological machinery. They examine the symptoms of subject and field in 
Kafka's fictional obsessions with law and desire, with "Oedipal traps and 
lines of flight." They do so to postulate a positive theory of a "minor litera-
ture" that deterritorializes language and deforms cultural and psychological 
representations. 
Third, by situating Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus against Deleuze's 
evolving philosophical corpus, and against Guattari's clinical and political 
program, Bogue demonstrates clearly the significance of these two works 
(particularly the earlier and notorious Anti-Oedipus) beyond their historical 
identification with the Parisian barricades of 1968, an event discussed in the 
"Introduction," Rather than being concerned with revolution in a Marxist 
sense, Deleuze and Guattari propose" a politics of creativity" that focuses on 
the potential of the always-already open cultural system, instead of on an or-
igin enabled by insurrection, or on a completion enabled by a new order of 
things. In other words, this study will help explain (despite Bogue's claim for 
Guattari's contribution) why Foucault suggests that, in the field of the human 
sciences, the Twentieth Century may someday be known as Deleuzian. 
Deleuze and Guattari's collaborative volumes engage in a Nietzschean syn-
thesis of the Marxist theory of production, and Freud's theory of the libido, in 
the conflated term "desiring- production." They state that the Oedipal sce-
nario structures desire in capitalist countries, and that psychoanalysis helps 
to enforce the restrictions imposed by that structure. Also, they agree with 
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the Marxist formulation that capitalism reduces all human interactions to 
"commodity relations of universal equivalency." Capitalism therefore "deter-
ritorializes" desire by exploding the limits not only created by the Oedipal 
scenario, but the limits created by other traditional structures as well. Yet, 
capitalism also "reterritorializes" desire by forcing it to manifest itself through 
the network of commodity-relations. While the Oedipal scenario helps to fo-
cus human desire through the family, leaving its residue to wander the lev-
eled field of universal equivalency, capitalism also generates "schizophrenic 
fluxes" of material and human refuse, which is then forced through the Oedi-
pal conduit. Deleuze and Guattari then define clinical schizophrenia as the 
human refuse (institutionalized or not) in which "Oedipalization has not 'tak-
en'." Their project is to build a psychoanalysis, aesthetics and politics that va-
lorizes the schizo-flux. They provide a schizo-analysis of the multiple cultural 
machines of desiring- production, and a program for resistance to those ma-
chines based on nomadic and rhizomatic thought and action, a theory of 
subjective contingency and aggregation that explains simultaneously the 
"rhizomatic" writings of Kafka, jazz performance and even the "events" of 
John Cage, the multiple human formations of the dance troop Pilobolus, as 
well as the "cells" of the PLO and the "affinity groups" of the Weatherman 
faction of the SDS. 
II 
Ronald Bogue's Deleuze and Guattari succeeds brilliantly and I have but 
two reservations with his emphasis. First, Deleuze and Guattari weakly repre-
sents Deleuze's interest in Bergson's elaboration of Nietzsche's "science of 
becoming" in human psychology, physics and biology. Through such works 
as Matter and Memory, Duration and Simultaneity and Creative Evolution, Berg-
son's discussion of contingent duration, memory and elan vital had seminal 
influence on Deleuze's study of Proust's Remembrance of Things Past (as well 
as on Proust himself), Deleuze's studies on cinema, as well as his formula-
tions of processes mainly identified with Nietzsche's concept of the nomad. 
This interest may be examined in Deleuze's own study, entitled Bergsonism, 
which gets scant attention in Deleuze and Guattari. This work not only re-
mains as influential in Bergson scholarship as Nietzsche and Philosophy has 
been with Nietzsche scholars, but would also help illuminate what Bogue 
explains with otherwise great success. Deleuze draws on Bergson's theory of 
memory, duration and elan vital to conceive of the ways in which multiple 
experiences of contingent duration-and of the contingent nature of invented 
models of past and future with reference to pure duration-play in the fields 
of simulacra that constitute culture. These fields are governed by the "will to 
power" and the Eternal Return; and Deleuze and Guattari's method helps to 
dissolve distinctions among the disciplines, and distinctions among the cate-
gories that distinguish those disciplines: signs, thoughts, concepts, institu-
tions as subjectivities, and so forth. While Gillian Rose, in her work The Di-
alectics of Nihilism, argues dismissively that Deleuze's philosophy is meta-
physical and should be called "the new Bergsonism," she has intuited an 
important genealogy that begins with Boltzmann's Order Principle from ther-
H' 
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modynamics and emerges in attempts to construct correspondences between 
physics and cultural processes, the most successful formulation of which has 
been information theory. 
My second reservation thus concerns how Bogue draws out then drops 
hints of a crucial drama that begins with Deleuze's fascination with Nietzsche's 
obsession on a physis of difference and of becoming. A theory of correspon-
dences between nature on the one hand and consciousness and culture for-
mation on the other that Nietzsche (and Bogue) describe largely in the termi-
nology of dynamics (a physics of forces), this physis seems instead to draw on 
what lIya Prigogine has argued as the ideologically opposed discourses of 
dynamics and thermodynamics, one emphasizing precision, geometry and 
the reversibility of time, the other emphasizing statistical formulations, bio-
logical processes and the irreversibility of time. (Deleuze and Prigogine quote 
each other's works on a number of occasions, by the way.) Since a reversible 
model of time requires a static, regulated duration represented (for example, 
in calculus) as an infinite series of still frames of discrete moments framed by 
a geometry of space-time interstices, it is hard to account for the ways in 
which Nietzsche's fascination with the "will to power" and the "Eternal 
Return" fits into such a dynamiCS, unless one identifies the reactive machin-
ery of ressentiment with dynamics, a machinery that attempts to control the 
contingencies of duration. In other words, Nietzsche's eternal return, as a sci-
ence of becoming, is Bergson's concept of contingent duration, which is Pri-
gogine's arrow of time underlying all systems, dynamic and thermodynamic. 
The question is, what do we make of Nietzsche, Bergson, Deleuze and Guat-
tari and Prigogine's attempt to construct correspondences between the laws 
of physics and the laws of consciousness and culture? 
Needless to say, these two reservations merely indicate my reaction to 
Bogue's book, the limits to a powerfully useful introduction to Deleuze and 
Guattari. Perhaps they suggest directions for further research. Except for 
these reservations, Ronald Bogue's Deleuze and Guattari is a good read in-
deed. 
Arizona State University Martin E. Rosenberg 
Languages of the Unsayable: The Play of Negativity in Literature and Literary 
Theory, ed. Sanford Budick and Wolfgang Iser. New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 1989. Pp. xxi + 394. 1 photo. $53.95. 
In a critical age defined by the fashionable shibboleths of negativity, uncer-
tainty, self-consciousness, contradiction, differance, and insufficiency it is en-
tirely appropriate that a volume articulating the "play of negativity" appear. 
Published as the third in Columbia University's Irvine Studies in the Humani-
ties with Robert Folkenflik as general editor, this important work collects fif-
teen essays along with a lucid introduction under the general assumption 
that "[w]hat allows the unsayable to speak is the undoing of the spoken 
through negativity. Since the spoken is doubled by what remains silent, 
undoing the spoken gives voice to the inherent silence which itself helps sta-
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bilize what the spoken is meant to mean" (xvii). The result of extensive con-
sultations between its contributors that culminated in a conference led by the 
co-editors in June of 1986 at the Institute for Advanced Studies of Hebrew 
University in Jerusalem, the final achievement is impressive: a provocative 
and heterogeneous display of the breadth of scholarship on negativity along 
with a convincing demonstration of the extent to which unsayability and 
negativity are embedded historically and ideologically in Occidental literary 
discourse. 
The collection is divided into three parts: (1) "Unsaying," in which the 
philosophical groundwork is laid through studies of negative theology, Hei-
degger, Adorno, and Beckett; (2) "Proliferating," in which the more specific 
literary applications of negativity are pursued in essays on modern poetry, 
Celan, Blake, Faulkner, medieval allegory, George Eliot, and the "tradition" 
that links Homer and Virgil to Dryden and Pope; (3) "Perfonning," in which 
negation and textual play are studied, first by Wolfgang Iser's more theoreti-
cal essay on "The Play of the Text" and then by Stanley Cavell, who puts 
negative play into practice by examining the "melodrama of the unknown 
woman" (340) in "Naughty Orators: Negation of Voice in Gaslight." 
The introductory remarks on "Modes of Negativity" suggest that 
negativity, or some equivalent means of eschewing indicative terminol-
ogy, becomes inevitable when we consider the implications, omissions, 
or cancellations that are necessarily part of any writing or speaking. 
These lacunae indicate that practically all formulations (written or spo-
ken) contain a tacit dimension, so that each manifest text has a kind of 
latent double ... this inherent doubling in language defies verbaliza-
tion. It forms the written and unwritable-unsaid and unsayable-base 
of the utterance. But it does not therefore negate the formulations of 
the text or saying. Rather it conditions them through blanks and nega-
tions. (xii) 
Though the co-editors' introductory remarks posit distinctions between the 
concepts of negation, negativity, and nothingness (xii-xiii), the distinctions 
remain, perhaps deliberately so, hazy. For example, on the one hand we are 
told that "[i]n its undetermined proliferation, negatiVity speaks for something 
that is arguably as real as anything else we know, even if it can be located 
only by carving out a void within what is being said" (xi) while, on the other 
we are told somewhat paradoxically that the "operations [of negativity] . 
can never be equated with nothing, nothingness, or denial, or with the aims 
of avoiding or nullifying" (xiii). 
We are also told that "negation ... must be distinguished from negativity" 
(xii) without a sufficient elaboration of that important distinction, or a suffi-
cient definition of "negation." In Budick's essay "Tradition in the Space of 
Negativity," as part of a discussion of apostrophe and negativity in Homer 
and Virgil and their translations by Dryden and Pope, there is a reiteration of 
a rather loose distinction between negation and negativity (taken from Iser's 
The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response): 
Blanks and negations increase the density of fictional texts, for the 
omissions and cancellations indicate that practically all the fonnula-
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tions of the text refer to an unformulated background, and so the for-
mulated text has a kind of unformulated double. This 'double' we ... 
call negativity. (317) 
Similar as it is to a previously cited passage, one wonders about the unwrit-
ten nature of these "[b]lanks and negations" as they are intended in the con-
text of the volume. On the one hand, negativity seems a "means of eschew-
ing indicative terminology," a function that seems more properly attributable 
to "negation," whereas, on the other hand, negativity is not a means but 
rather an "unformulated background" doubling the "formulated text." The 
problems that inhere in Budick's and Iser's theoretical discourse about the 
unsaid are significant for how they initiate further questions about the reson-
ant silences and omissions that give depth to discourse, the "forms of things 
unknown" which the "poet's pen / Turns ... to shapes.. [giving] aery 
nothing / A local habitation and a name" (A Midsummer Night's Dream, V.i. 
15-17). Certainly, the questions asked by Pierre Macherey seem pertinent 
here (as does his rather puzzling omission from the substance of these es-
says): "in order to say anything, there are certain things which must not be said 
... Silences shape all speech ... Can we say that this silence [sic] is hidden? 
What is it? A condition of existence-point of departure, methodical begin-
ning-essential foundation-ideal culmination-absolute origin which lends 
meaning to the endeavour? Means or form of connection" (A Theory of Liter-
ary Production [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978, 85])? The theoretical 
framework behind the use of the term "negation" would seem to require a 
similar reevaluation to determine what constitutes a "negation" and what re-
lationship "negation" has to the "unformulated double" that is the negativity 
immanent in a text. 
Along the same lines is the suggestion made by the editors that "negativity 
not only shows that it is not negative, since it constantly lures absence into 
presence. While continually subverting that presence, negativity, in fact, 
changes it into a carrier of absence of which we would not otherwise know 
anything" (xiv). The paradox of a negativity that is "not negative" suggests 
that negativity entails an interplay between the "negative" and the "not nega-
tive." Such an interplay raises ontological, epistemological, not to mention 
linguistic questions about experience as it is expressed in language: Is lan-
guage not so much what it says but what it fails to say, avoids saying, or 
frames as unsayable? How can we know and define the silent otherness that 
inheres in language? How can language and therefore literature express their 
unsayability while continuing to sustain meaning? The implicit thesis that 
language is most evocative, most meaningful, most plentiful and multivalent, 
at the point at which it unsays and gives vent to the inexpressible through 
the "play of negativity" is a challenge which readers of this volume cannot 
avoid. The criticisms raised here point to the need for a critical debate on is-
sues relating to negativity and do not detract from this book as a significant 
attempt to formulate and apply a theoretical framework to understanding the 
play of negativity and unsayability in discourse. 
The lengthy lead essay, "How to Avoid Speaking" (originally published as 
"Comment ne pas parler: Denegations" in Psyche: Inventions de /'autre [Paris: 
Galilee, 1987]) by Jacques Derrida shows the myriad connections between 
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mystic and theoretical practices that affirm the paradoxical presence of the 
negative. The essay provisionally supposes "that negative theology consists 
of considering that every predicative language is inadequate to the essence, 
in truth to the hyperessentiality (the being beyond Being) of God; conse-
quently, only a negative 'apophatic' attribution can claim to approach God, 
and to prepare us for a silent intuition of God" (4). Invoking Plato, Pseudo 
Dionysius, Meister Eckhart, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Jean-Luc Marion, 
Derrida's essay reinscribes Wittgenstein's seminal notions (from the Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus): "6.522-The inexpressible, indeed exists. It shows itself; 
it is the mystical" and '7.-Concerning that about which one cannot speak, 
one must remain silent" (11). 
For Derrida, the obligation ("one must") to remain silent is reinscribed "into 
the order or the promise of a 'one must speak,' 'one must-not avoid speak-
ing'; or rather 'it is necessary (il [aut) that there be a trace.' No, 'it is neces-
sary that there have been a trace,' a sentence that one must simultaneously 
turn toward a past and toward a future that are as yet unpresentable" (11-
12). The "play of negativity" occurs at this imprecise juncture between speak-
ing and unspeaking, sound and silence, past and future. Literature and its 
criticism entail a "tracing" of the conjunction between what is affirmed and 
what is negated, what is spoken (expressible) and what is left unspoken 
(inexpressible), if one is to remember the past (by its unspoken traces embed-
ded in what is spoken) and create a future (by the necessity to speak and 
thereby anticipate the trace of the unspoken). 
The density of the argument, as is typical with Derrida, confronts the read-
er's capacity to formulate speech as well as to remain silent, recognizing all 
the while that "consciousness ... [is] that place in which is retained the sin-
gular power not to say what one knows, to keep a secret in the form of 
representation" (17). Derrida ends in the interrogative mode in which he be-
gins, by asking "If there were a purely pure experience of prayer, would one 
need religion and affirmative or negative theologies? Would one need a sup-
plement of prayer? But if there were no supplement, if quotation did not 
bend prayer, if prayer did not bend, if it did not submit to writing, would a 
theiology be possible? Would a theology be possible" (62)? Negation and si-
lence define the point at which speech ends and the hypostatic idea of a 
"purely pure experience of prayer" begins. Thus their "presence" leads, per-
haps, to the possibility of prayer, theology, and God. Certainly, the admix-
hue of Derrida's thought with Christian and Neoplatonic negative theology 
makes for a particularly evocative beginning to the collection; the essay 
deftly surveys the difficult terrain of apophatic thought while proleptically 
formulating the "place" of speech that is not speech in the (im)possibility of 
theology. 
The essays following Derrida's are no less challenging. Mercifully they 
avoid the all-too-frequent blight that falls upon such collections in which au-
thors refuse to acknowledge the intertextual context of their essays. Thus, 
Frank Kermode's essay on "Endings, Continued" in which he attempts an 
"updating" of The Sense of an Ending also reflects on Derrida's beginnings by 
reinscribing Derrida: "one must think of the khora [Platonic 'place'] as Diony-
sius thought of the good: as the formless which confers form. It is in this re-
spect that it seems to resemble the place to which negative theology hopes to 
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be directed by prayer as it passes through the wilderness of discourse" (77). 
In the same inter-reflective mode Kermode comments on Derrida's use of 
aposiopoesis, the rhetorical figure in which "the speaker comes to a sudden 
halt, as if unwilling or unable to proceed, though something not expressed 
must be understood" (OED): "you can use it ... to draw attention to the ac-
tual predicament of the speaker, hindered by the very processes of his own 
thought from moving on, from saying what comes next ... [it] substitutes si-
lence for speech" (89-90). That silence is the nothingness (or doubling) of 
speech raises the spectre "of the relation of ontological Nothingness to Being" 
(95) and the "possibility or impossibility of saying anything about that Being" 
(95). Gabriel Motzkin's essay, "Heidegger's Transcendent Nothing," reflects 
on these ideas while Gerald L. Bruns's essay, "Disappeared: Heidegger and 
the Emancipation of Language," considers Heidegger's by now commonplace 
notion (stated in "Das Wesen der Sprache") that '''the essential nature of lan-
guage flatly refuses to put itself in words-in the language, that is, in which 
we make statements about language' ... So when language speaks it does 
not do so (if we can imagine this) by means of language" (137). 
Jonathan Culler's essay "On the Negativity of Modem Poetry: Friedrich, 
Baudelaire, and the Critical Tradition," begins with Hugo Friedrich's assump-
tion that modern poetry is rife with negative categories including "[d]eforma-
tion, depersonalization, obscurity, dehumanization, incongruency, dissonance 
and empty ideality" (189). Culler takes the use of such categories, and espe-
cially depersonalization, to be "reductive" in that they "empty the lyric of 
everything except the movement of consciousness" thus "contribut[ingJ to an 
ideology of lyric and of self that systematically recuperates negativity" (197). 
The problem for Culler, then, is that such categories "produce a general 
model which obscures the aspects of the poems that resist the typical modes 
of recuperation" (197). Culler, assiduously takes to task Bruns's notion (ex-
pressed in Modern Poetry and the Idea of Language) that "the work becomes si-
lence, everything in it neutralized" (206) because of its "powerful appeal to 
the consolations of the negative" (206). Negative categories can lead to "radi-
cal eliminations" (206), repressions, and totalizations that require further con-
sideration for how they affect the critical process. This suggestion, coming as 
it does more or less at the centre of the book, alerts readers to the reductive 
dangers inherent in any discourse that claims the capacity to recuperate and 
inscribe the negative. Clearly Budick and Iser have not avoided dissension 
and difference within the collection and for this they are to be praised. 
Perhaps this volume's principal contribution to scholarship is its implicit 
suggestion that the unsayable and negativity are central to an emergent reev-
aluation of the Western intellectual tradition, a reevaluation that posits si-
lence, nothingness, voicelessness, negation, and inexpressibility as implicated 
in the pursuit (and deconstruction) of the rational. The most convincing evi-
dence of this pursuit's vast historical and ideological persistence lies in the 
number of critics, poets and philosophers who are not (or only cursorily) 
mentioned in the volume, yet whose contributions to our awareness of the 
negative and the unsayable have been substantial: Pascal, Donne, Rochester, 
Shakespeare, Sanches, Freud, Sartre, Valery, Kenneth Burke, Rosalie Colie, 
Macherey, Barthes, Nishida Kitaro, to mention only a few. Though the vol-
ume's focus is on Western thought it neglects significant crossovers to East-
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em thought, especially as related to Japanese Zen philosophy and Eastern 
onto theologies in which the formless and the unsayable figure significantly (a 
lack filled in part by Robert E. Carter, ed., God, the Self and Nothingness: Re-
fiections Eastern and Western [New York: Paragon House, 1990]). 
In a volume as diverse and rich as this it is perhaps unfair to point to what 
it fails to do. However, the absences must he noted as being almost equally 
resonant in the "play of negativity" that is this book. Certainly, as has just 
been suggested, an essay connecting elements of relevant Eastern philosophi-
cal thought to Western literary and critical practice would have been useful 
in enlarging the book's already substantial scope. The book also avoids direct 
confrontation with problems relating to the political nature and implications 
of unsaying and negativity: to what extent does the predilection for modes of 
negativity and unsaying function as a means to obscure or enhance the polit-
ical elements that figure in discourse? That tropes of inexpressibility and neg-
ativity have political uses in both literary and critical contexts is a fact that 
the book does not address sufficiently, especially given its genesis in Jerusa-
lem (and especially given the substantial space it devotes-two essays-to 
Heidegger). 
Perhaps the most tantalizing section of the book in what it promises to say 
but leaves unsaid is the third on "Play" with its two highly suggestive essays 
by Iser and Cavell. The sense of negativity and unsayability as elements in 
the performative function of language and expression, part, if you will, of 
their musical nature (yet another aspect of textual unsaying that is not ad-
dressed head-on), seems an important aspect of the discourse of negativity 
for, as Iser suggests, "[b]y allowing us to have absence as presence, play turns 
out to be a means whereby we may extend ourselves" (338). Negativity and 
unsaying create opportunities for self-extension and for the illusion of a pres-
ence that is inviolable (because it is unsaid). This notion is echoed by Cav-
ell's suggestion that "[b]oth excess and emptiness express the human wish to 
escape the human-the desire for the inhuman, or the demonic" (364) and 
leads to the larger questions of excess, emptiness, and the play of negativity 
as related to why we read (and write) literature and criticism. Implicit in the 
relationship between criticism and literature is the idea that critical unsaying 
"gives voice to [an] inherent silence" that can not otherwise be filled. That the 
"negative capability" of criticism may be said to "stabilize what the spoken is 
meant to mean" is one of the abiding myths which this book furthers, per-
haps at the expense of understanding negativity as a disruptive force pointing 
to the unspoken void beyond and implicit within the text's origins in the un-
spoken silence of the blank page. That the book ends with these provoca-
tions to further thought, evoking the unsayable resonances that inhere in 
Cavell's use of the image of "gaslight," is part of a clever design that suggests 
how much is left unsaid, and how resonant that unsaying remains. 
Trcnt Univcrsity Daniel Fischlin 
